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ABSTRACT
This paper examines equilibrium and welfare in a tractable class of economies with externalities,
strategic  complementarity  or  substitutability,  and  incomplete  information.  In  equilibrium,
complementarity amplifies aggregate volatility by increasing the sensitivity of actions to public
information; substitutability raises cross-sectional dispersion by increasing the sensitivity to private
information. To address whether these effects are undesirable from a welfare perspective, we
characterize the socially optimal degree of coordination and the efficient use of information. We
show how efficient allocations depend on the primitives of the environment, how they compare to
equilibrium, and how they can be understood in terms of a social trade-off between volatility and
dispersion. We next examine the social value of information in equilibrium. When the equilibrium
is  efficient,  welfare  necessarily  increases  with  the  accuracy  of  information;  and  it  increases
[decreases] with the extent to which information is common if and only if agents' actions are
strategic complements [substitutes]. When the equilibrium is inefficient, additional effects emerge
as information affects the gap between equilibrium and efficient allocations. We conclude with a few
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In many economic environments, such as economies with production externalities, incomplete ﬁ-
nancial markets, or monopolistic competition, the action an agent wishes to take depends on his
expectations not only about the underlying fundamentals but also about other agents’ actions. Fur-
thermore, diﬀerent agents have diﬀerent information about the fundamentals and hence diﬀerent
beliefs about what other agents are doing. Clearly, private incentives to coordinate and information
asymmetries impact equilibrium behavior. But, are these incentives socially warranted, and is the
decentralized use of information eﬃcient? Also, does more precise information improve eﬃciency
and welfare?
In this paper we examine equilibrium and welfare in a tractable class of concave economies
that feature rich external and strategic eﬀects–albeit a unique equilibrium–and asymmetric in-
formation.
There is a large number of ex-ante identical small agents each taking a continuous decision
(e.g., investment). Individual payoﬀs may depend, not only on one’s own action, but also on the
mean, and possibly the dispersion, of activity in the population–this is the source of external and
strategic eﬀects in the model. Agents observe noisy private and public signals about the underlying
economic fundamentals–this is the source of information asymmetry. Finally, payoﬀs are quadratic
and information is Gaussian, which makes the analysis tractable.
In equilibrium, strategic complementarity raises the sensitivity of actions to public informa-
tion; strategic substitutability raises the sensitivity to private information. Common noise in pub-
lic information generates volatility; idiosyncratic noise in private information generates dispersion.
It follows that complementarity contributes to higher volatility, substitutability to higher disper-
sion.1
These are interesting positive properties but alone have no normative content–there should
be no presumption that the impact of strategic eﬀects on the use of information and thereby on
volatility and dispersion is undesirable from a welfare perspective. To address this issue, one needs
to characterize the eﬃcient use of information,w h i c hi so u rﬁrst main result.
We deﬁne eﬃcient allocations as the ones that maximize ex-ante utility under the constraint
that information can not be centralized. The eﬃcient allocation for a given economy can be
represented as the equilibrium of a ﬁctitious economy where individual payoﬀs are manipulated to
reﬂect social motives (that is, to internalize payoﬀ interdependencies). The slope of best responses
with respect to the mean activity in this ﬁctitious economy measures the extent to which agents
must align their choices for eﬃciency to obtain; it deﬁnes what we call the (socially) optimal degree
of coordination. The analogue for the actual economy deﬁnes the equilibrium degree of coordination.
1The ampliﬁcation eﬀects of various sorts of complementarities are the subject of a vast literature. See Cooper
(1990) for a review of complete-information applications and Morris and Shin (2002, 2003) for incomplete information.
1We ﬁrst show how the eﬃcient allocation depends on the primitives of the environment and
how it compares to equilibrium allocation. As with equilibrium, complementarity contributes to
a positive optimal degree of coordination, substitutability to a negative. But unlike equilibrium,
the optimal degree of coordination also depends on other external payoﬀ eﬀects that are irrelevant
for private incentives. In the absence of such non-strategic external eﬀects, the optimal degree of
coordination is higher than the equilibrium one when agents’ actions are strategic complements
(and lower when they are strategic substitutes).
This result highlights the danger in extrapolating positive properties to normative implica-
tions: in economies with complementarities, the high sensitivity to public information and the
ampliﬁcation of volatility featured in equilibrium can be socially desirable.
We next relate the optimal degree of coordination to the eﬃcient use of information. Because
of payoﬀ concavity, both aggregate volatility and cross-sectional dispersion induce welfare losses.
When comparing allocations that diﬀer in their eﬀective degree of coordination–and hence in their
sensitivity to common and idiosyncratic noise–the planner eﬀectively faces a trade-oﬀ between
volatility and dispersion. The resolution of this trade-oﬀ is reﬂected in the optimal degree of coor-
dination: the latter increases with social aversion to dispersion and decreases with social aversion
to volatility.
Our second main result is a characterization of the social value of information. For this purpose,
we ﬁnd it useful to parameterize the information structure by the level and the composition of
noise in the agents’ forecasts of the underlying fundamentals. We identify the accuracy of available
information with the precision of these forecasts, that is, the reciprocal of total noise, and its
transparency (or commonality) with the correlation of forecast error across agents, that is, the
extent to which noise is common. Since in the absence of external eﬀects welfare depends only on
the level and not on the composition of noise, this parametrization seems most appropriate from a
theoretical point of view.2
When the equilibrium is eﬃcient, welfare necessarily increases with the accuracy of information.
Moreover, welfare increases [decreases] with the transparency of information if and only if agents’
actions are strategic complements [substitutes]. Eﬃciency thus implies a clear relationship between
the form of strategic interaction and the social value of information.
When the equilibrium is ineﬃcient, information may also aﬀect the gap between equilibrium and
eﬃcient allocations. Its welfare eﬀects then depend, not only on the form of strategic interaction,
but also on two key aspects of this gap: the discrepancy between optimal and equilibrium degrees of
coordination, and the correlation between ﬁrst-best and complete-information equilibrium activity.
2This parametrization is also appropriate for some applied questions. Think, for example, of a central banker
contemplating whether to transmit information in a transparent or ambiguous way. This need not be simply a choice
about the release of more or less information, but rather a choice about the extent to which individuals will adopt
idiosyncratic or common interpretations of the same piece of information.
2We conclude the paper by illustrating how our results can help understand the ineﬃciencies of
equilibrium and the social value of information in speciﬁc applications.
In a typical model of production spillovers where complementarities emerge in investment
choices, coordination is ineﬃciently low. Moreover, welfare unambiguously increases with either
the accuracy or the transparency of information–a case for timely provision of relevant information
by the government or the media.
The same result appears to hold in standard Keynesian monetary economies. In contrast,
coordination is ineﬃciently high and transparency can reduce welfare in economies resembling
Keynes’ beauty-contest parable for ﬁnancial markets. Furthermore, in economies where equilibrium
ﬂuctuations are largely ineﬃcient even under complete information, welfare may decrease with both
accuracy and transparency–from a social perspective, ignorance could be a bless.
Finally, we consider an example of a competitive production economy where the equilibrium
is eﬃcient even under incomplete information. Since individual actions are strategic substitutes,
welfare increases with accuracy but decreases with transparency–perhaps a case for “constructive
ambiguity” in central bank communication.
Related literature. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to conduct a complete
welfare analysis for the class of economies considered here. The closest ascendants are Cooper and
John (1988), who examine economies with complementarities but complete information, and Vives
(1988), who shows eﬃciency of equilibria in a class of competitive economies that is a special case
of the more general class considered here (see Section 6.4).
However, this paper is certainly not the ﬁrst to examine the social value of information. Hirsh-
leifer (1971) highlights how distributional eﬀects can drive a wedge between the private and social
value of information. More recently, and more closely related to this paper, Morris and Shin (2002)
show that public information can reduce welfare in an economy that resembles a “beauty contest”
and that features strategic complementarity. Angeletos and Pavan (2004) and Hellwig (2005),
on the other hand, provide counterexamples where public information is socially valuable despite
complementarity–a real economy with investment complementarities in the ﬁrst paper, a monetary
economy with pricing complementarities in the second. These works illustrate the non-triviality
of the welfare eﬀects of information within the context of speciﬁc applications, but do not explain
the general principles underlying the question of interest. We ﬁll the gap here by showing how the
social value of information depends, not only on the form of strategic interaction, but also on other
external eﬀects that determine the discrepancy between equilibrium and eﬃcient allocations.
The literature on rational expectations has emphasized how the aggregation of disperse private
i n f o r m a t i o ni nm a r k e t sc a ni m p r o v ea l l o c a t i v ee ﬃciency (e.g., Grossman, 1981). Laﬀont (1985)
and Messner and Vives (2001), on the other hand, highlight how informational externalities can
generate ineﬃciency in the private collection and use of information. Although the information
3structure here is exogenous, the paper provides an input into this line of research by studying how
the welfare eﬀects of private and public information depend on payoﬀ externalities.
The paper also contributes to the debate about central-bank transparency. While earlier work
focused on incentive problems (e.g., Canzoneri, 1985; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2001; Stokey, 2002),
recent work emphasizes the coordinating role of public information. Morris and Shin (2002, 2005)
and Heinemann and Cornand (2004) argue that central-bank disclosures can lead to welfare losses
if markets behave like in Keynes’ “beauty contest”; Svensson (2005) and Woodford (2005) question
the practical relevance of this result; Hellwig (2005) and Roca (2005) show that public disclosures
can improve welfare by reducing price dispersion. In Section 6.3 we highlight that the welfare
eﬀects of such disclosures ought to depend on whether the business cycle is eﬃcient under complete
information, while in Section 6.4 we show that an argument for constructive ambiguity could be
made even in eﬃcient competitive economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. We examine
equilibrium in Section 3, eﬃciency in Section 4, and the social value of information in Section 5.
We turn to applications in Section 6. The Appendix includes proofs omitted in the main text.
2 The model
Actions and payoﬀs. Consider an economy with a measure-one continuum of agents, each
choosing an action k ∈ R.L e t Ψ denote the cumulative distribution function for k in the cross-
section of the population, K ≡
R
kdΨ(k) the mean action, and θ =( θ1,...,θN) ∈ RN a vector of
exogenous payoﬀ-relevant variables (the fundamentals), with N ≥ 1.3 Individual utility is given by
u = U(k,K,θ), (1)
where U : RN+2 → R is a strictly concave quadratic function.4,5 Finally, we let W (K,θ) ≡
U(K,K,θ) denote utility (also, aggregate welfare) when all agents choose the same action.
Externality emerges whenever UK 6=0 , strategic complementarity whenever UkK 6=0 .6 We
restrict −UkK/Ukk within (−1,+1). As we will see in the next section, −UkK/Ukk is the slope of
best responses; restricting this slope within (−1,+1) is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence
of a unique stable equilibrium. We also impose concavity at both the individual and aggregate
level in the sense that Ukk < 0 and WKK ≡ Ukk +2 UkK + UKK < 0.I fU were not concave, best
3T h ea n a l y s i si ss i m p l e s tw h e nN =1 ,b u tN>1 allow us capture the possibility that there are fundamentals
that are relevant for equilibrium but not for eﬃcient allocations, and vice versa.
4That is, U(k,K,θ)=vUv
0 where U is a (n +3 )× (n +3 )negative-deﬁnite matrix and v =( 1 ,k,K,θ).
5Note that U depends on Ψ only through its ﬁrst moment (mean activity); we extend the model to incorporate
an external eﬀect from the second moment (cross-sectional dispersion) at the end of Section 4.
6In what follows, we often refer to UkK as the complementarity even if UkK < 0. That is, we identify substitutability
with negative complementarity.
4responses would not be well-deﬁned; similarly, if W were not concave, the ﬁr s tb e s tw o u l dn o tb e
well-deﬁned.7
Information. Before agents move, nature draws θn, for n ∈ {1,...,N}, from independent
Normal distributions with mean μn and variance σ2
θn. The realization of θ =( θn) is not observed
by the agents. Instead, for each n, agents observe private signals xi
n = θn + ξi
n and public signals
yn = θn + εn, where ξi
n and εn are, respectively, idiosyncratic and common noises, independent of
one another as well as of θ, with variances, respectively, σ2
xn and σ2
yn.
The common posterior for θn given public information alone is Normal with mean zn ≡
E[θn|y]=λnyn+(1−λn)μn and variance σ2
zn, where λn ≡ σ−2
yn /σ−2
zn and σzn ≡ (σ−2
yn +σ−2
θn )−1/2. In
what follows, we often identify public information with z rather than with y.8 Private posteriors,
on the other hand, are Normal with mean E[θn|xi,y]=( 1− δn)xi




n and σn ≡ (σ−2
xn + σ−2
zn )−1/2.
If we let ωi
n ≡ θn − E[θn|xi,y] denote agent i’s forecast error about θn, then
σ2












Hence, σn measures the total noise in agents’ forecasts about the fundamentals and δn the extent
to which noise is common across agents.9 We accordingly identify the accuracy of information with
σ−2
n and its transparency (or publicity)w i t hδn.
We prefer to parametrize the information structure by (δn,σn) rather than (σxn,σyn) for two
reasons. First, this is without any loss of generality since, given the prior, there is a one-to-one














Second, a change in σxn or σyn combines a change in the level of noise, σn, with a change in its
composition, δn. If there were no externalities and strategic interactions, welfare would depend
only on σn,n o tδn. With strategic interactions, instead, the extent to which information is public
plays an important role since it aﬀects the structure of higher order beliefs. From a theoretical
point of view, it thus seems most interesting to separate these two eﬀects.10
7For tractability, we have restricted U, and hence W, to be quadratic. For non-quadratic concave environments,
our results represent approximations that are better the lower the noise in information. Convexities, on the other
hand, may introduce eﬀects about which our analysis is not appropriate. For example, aggregate convexities can
generate a social value for lotteries.
8Throughout, we use the convenient vector notation x =( xn),y=( yn), and similarly for all other variables. We
also drop the superscript i whenever it does not create confusion.
9Note that δn is also an increasing transformation of the relative precision of public information.
10In the context of speciﬁc applications, however, it is also interesting to translate the results in terms of comparative
statics with respect to (σx,σ z). See Section 6 for some examples.
53 Equilibrium allocations
Each agent chooses k so as to maximize his expected utility, E[U(k,K,θ)|x,y]. The solution to this
optimization problem gives the best response for the individual. The ﬁxed point is the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium allocation is any function k : R2N → R such that, for all (x,y),
k(x,y) = argmax
k0 E[ U(k0,K,θ) | x,y ],
where K(θ,ε)=E[ k(x,y) | θ,ε ], for all (θ,ε).11
It is useful to consider ﬁrst the complete-information benchmark. When θ is known, the
(unique) equilibrium is k = κ, where κ is the unique solution to Uk (κ,κ,θ)=0 . Since U is
quadratic, κ is linear: κ(θ)=κ0+κ1θ1+...+κNθN for some constants κn ∈ R,n∈ {0,1,...,N}.12
The incomplete-information equilibrium is then characterized as follows.
Proposition 1 Let κ(θ)=κ0 + κ1θ1 + ... + κNθN denote the complete-information equilibrium





(i) An allocation k : R2n → R is an equilibrium if and only
k(x,y)=E[( 1− α)κ + αK | x,y ] for all (x,y) (4)
where K(θ,ε)=E[k(x,y)|θ,ε].




κn [(1 − γn)xn + γnzn], (5)
γn = δn +
αδn(1 − δn)
1 − α(1 − δn)
for all n ∈ ¯ N. (6)
Proof. Part (i). Take any strategy k : R2N → R and let K(θ,ε)=E[k(x,y)|θ,ε].A b e s t -
response is a strategy k0(x,y) that solves the ﬁrst-order condition
E[Uk(k0,K,θ)|x,y]=0
11A state of the world is given by the realizations of θ, ε, and {ξ
i}i∈[0,1]. However, since ξ is i.i.d. across agents,
K and other aggregates are functions of (θ,ε) alone.
12Since U is quadratic, κ0 = −Uk (0,0,0)/(Ukk + UkK) and κn = −Ukθn/(Ukk + UkK),n∈ {1,...,N}. It follows
that κn 6=0if and only if Ukθ 6=0 .
13The assumption ¯ N 6= ∅ avoids the trivial case that the fundamentals are irrelevant for equilibrium.
6for all (x,y). Using Uk(κ,κ,θ)=0for all θ, and the fact that U is quadratic, the best-response
function must satisfy E[Ukk(k0 − κ)+UkK(K − κ)|x,y]=0 , or equivalently,
k0(x,y)=E[( 1− α)κ + αK | x,y ]
for all (x,y). In equilibrium, k0(x,y)=k(x,y), which gives (4).
Part (ii). Since E[κ|x,y] is linear in (x,z), it is natural to look for a ﬁxed point that is linear
in x and z. Thus suppose the equilibrium is
k(x,y)=a + b · x + c · z (7)
for some coeﬃcients a ∈ R,b∈ RN and c ∈ RN.14 Then K (θ,ε)=a+b·θ+c·z and therefore (4)
reduces to
k(x,y)=( 1− α)κ0 + αa +( ( 1− α)κ + αb) · E[θ|x,y]+αc · z
where κ =( κ1,...,κ n). Substituting E[θ|x,y]=( I − ∆)x + ∆z, where I is the N × N identity
matrix and ∆ is the N × N diagonal matrix with n-th element equal to δn, we conclude that (7)
is an equilibrium if and only if a, b and c solve
a =( 1− α)κ0 + αa, b =( I − ∆)[(1− α)κ + αb], and c = ∆[(1 − α)κ + αb]+αc.
Equivalently a = κ0,b n = κn(1 − α)(1 − δn)/[1 − α(1 − δn)], and cn = κnδn/[1 − α(1 − δn)],
n ∈ {1,...,N}. Note that bn + cn = κn always; bn = cn =0whenever κn =0 ;and bn ∈ (0,κ n)and
cn ∈ (0,κ n) otherwise. Letting γn ≡ cn/κn ∈ (0,1) for any n ∈ ¯ N gives (5)-(6). Clearly, this is the
unique linear equilibrium. Furthermore, since best responses are linear in E[θ|x,y] and E[K|x,y],
there do not exist equilibria other than this one. (This follows from the same argument as in Morris
and Shin (2002); our payoﬀs are more general but the structure of beliefs and best responses is
essentially the same.)
Condition (4) has a simple interpretation: an agent’s best response is an aﬃne combination
of his expectation of some given “target” and his expectation of aggregate activity. The target is
simply the complete-information equilibrium. The slope of best responses with respect to aggregate
activity, α, is what we identify with the equilibrium degree of coordination.
The sensitivity of the equilibrium allocation to private and public information depends on both
the degree of coordination and the transparency of information.When α =0 , the weights on signals
xn and zn are simply the Bayesian weights and hence γn = δn. The term [αδn(1−δn)]/[1−α(1−δn)]
thus measures the excess sensitivity of equilibrium allocations to public information as compared
to the case where there are no complementarities. Note that this term is increasing in α. Stronger
complementarities thus lead to a higher relative sensitivity to public information. This is a direct
14A dot between two vectors denotes inner product.
7implication of the fact that, in equilibrium, public information is a relatively better predictor
of aggregate behavior than private information. In other words, public information has also a
coordinating role.
If information were complete (σn =0for all n, or at least for all n ∈ ¯ N), all agents would
choose k = K = κ. Incomplete information aﬀects equilibrium behavior in two ways. First, common
noise generates (non-fundamental) volatility, that is, variation in aggregate activity K around the
complete-information level κ. Second, idiosyncratic noise generates dispersion,t h a ti s ,v a r i a t i o ni n
the cross-section of the population. The ﬁrst is measured by Va r(K−κ), the second by Va r(k−K).
Their dependence on the degree of coordination and the information structure is characterized
below.15
Proposition 2 (i) Volatility, Va r(K−κ), necessarily increases with α and σn, and increases with
δn if and only if α<0 or δn < 1−α




(ii) Dispersion, Va r(k−K), necessarily decreases with α and δn and increases with σn. More-
over, the impact of noise on dispersion decreases with α (i.e.,
∂2Va r (k−K)
∂σn∂α < 0).
Higher complementarity thus mitigates the impact of noise on dispersion, and obtains a better
alignment of individual choices, but ampliﬁes aggregate volatility. Higher transparency also reduces
dispersion possibly at the expense of higher volatility. Higher accuracy, on the other hand, reduces
both volatility and dispersion. We will examine in more detail the welfare eﬀects of information
later. In the next section, we turn to the characterization of the eﬃcient allocation and show how
this relates to the optimal degree of coordination.
4E ﬃcient allocations
The property that complementarity generates high sensitivity to common noise, and thereby am-
pliﬁes volatility, is interesting on its own. But this is only a positive property. To address the
normative question of whether these eﬀects are socially undesirable, one needs to understand what
is the eﬃcient use of information. We deﬁne eﬃcient allocations as those that maximize ex-ante
welfare (expected utility) among the ones that are measurable in the agents’ decentralized infor-
mation.













k(x,y)dP(x|θ,ε), for all (θ,ε).
where P(θ,ε) stands for the c.d.f. of the joint distribution of (θ,ε) and P(x|θ,ε) for the conditional
distribution of x given θ and ε.
We believe that this notion of eﬃciency is appropriate for the purposes of this paper. The
allocation deﬁned above is the solution to the “team problem” where agents choose a strategy
cooperatively and commit to it. It thus answers exactly the question of interest for this paper,
namely how allocations and welfare would change if agents were to internalize their payoﬀ interde-
pendences and appropriately adjust their use of available information.16 What is more, as we will
see in Section 5, it is precisely this notion of eﬃciency that helps understand the social value of
information in equilibrium.
We start by deriving a necessary and suﬃcient condition for eﬃcient allocations.
Lemma 1 An allocation k : R2N → R is eﬃcient if and only if, for almost all (x,y),
E[ Uk(k(x,y),K,θ)+UK(K,K,θ) | x,y ]=0 , (8)
where K(θ,ε)=E[k(x,y)|θ,ε].


















The ﬁrst order conditions for K(θ,ε) and k(x,y) are therefore given by
Z
x
UK(k(x,y),K(θ,ε),θ)dP(x|θ,ε)+λ(θ,ε)=0 for almost all (θ,ε) (9)
Z
(θ,ε)
[Uk(k(x,y),K(θ,ε),θ) − λ(θ,ε)]dP(θ,ε|x,y)=0 for almost all (x,y) (10)
Noting that UK is linear in its arguments and that K(θ,ε)=
R
x k(x,y)dP(x|θ,ε), condition (9)
can be rewritten as −λ(θ,ε)=UK(K(θ,ε),K(θ,ε),θ). Replacing this into (10) gives (8). Since U
is strictly concave and the constraint is linear, (8) is both necessary and suﬃcient, which completes
the proof.
16Our eﬃciency concept is the same as in Radner (1962) or Vives (1988) and shares with Hayek (1945) the idea
that information is disperse and can not be communicated to a “center”. Clearly, this is diﬀerent from eﬃciency
concepts that assume costless communication and focus on incentive constraints (e.g., Mirrlees, 1971; Holmstrom and
Myerson, 1983).
9This result has a simple interpretation. The ﬁrst-best allocation, which corresponds to the
case where θ is commonly known and is henceforth denoted by κ∗(θ), maximizes W (K,θ) ≡
U(K,K,θ). It thus solves the the ﬁrst-order condition WK(K,θ)=0 , or equivalently Uk(K,K,θ)+
UK(K,K,θ)=0 .17 The incomplete-information counterpart of this condition is (8).
We can then expand this condition to characterize the eﬃcient allocation under incomplete
information in a similar fashion as with equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let κ∗ (θ)=κ∗
0 +κ∗
1θ1 +... +κ∗
NθN denote the ﬁrst-best allocation, ¯ N∗ ≡ {n ≥ 1:
κ∗








(i) An allocation k : R2N → R is eﬃcient if and only if
k(x,y)=E[( 1− α∗)κ∗ + α∗K | x,y ] for almost all (x,y), (12)
where K(θ,ε) ≡ E[k(x,y)|θ,ε].




n∈ ¯ N∗ κ∗




n = δn +
α∗δn(1 − δn)
1 − α∗(1 − δn)
for all n ∈ ¯ N∗. (14)
In equilibrium, each agent’s action was an aﬃne combination of his expectation of κ, the
complete-information equilibrium action, and of his expectation of aggregate activity. The same is
true here for the eﬃcient allocation if we replace κ with κ∗,t h eﬁrst-best action, and α with α∗. In
this sense, condition (12) is the analogue for eﬃciency of the best response for equilibrium. This
idea is formalized by the following.
Proposition 4 Given an economy e =( U;σ,δ,μ,σθ) ∈ E, let U (e) be the set of functions U0 such
that, if agents perceived their payoﬀst ob eU0 rather than U, the equilibrium would coincide with
the eﬃcient allocation for e.
(i) For every e, U (e) is non-empty.
(ii) For every e,U 0 ∈ U (e) only if α0 ≡− U0
kK/U0
kk equals α∗.
Part (i) states that the eﬃcient allocation can be represented as the equilibrium of a ﬁctitious
game where individual incentives are manipulated so as to coincide with social incentives.18 Part









0 = −WK (0,0)/WKK and κ
∗
n =
−WKθn/WKK,n∈ {1,...,N}. It follows that κ
∗
n 6=0if and only if WKθn ≡ Ukθn + UKθn 6=0 .
18In some cases, this may also suggest a way to implement the eﬃcient allocation. For example, the government
may be able to use taxes and subsidies to fashion individual best-responses.
10(ii), on the other hand, explains why we identify α∗ with the optimal degree of coordination: α∗
describes the level of complementarity that agents should perceive if the eﬃcient allocation were
to obtain as an equilibrium outcome, that is, if all externalities were to be internalized.
The counterpart of optimal coordination is the eﬃcient use of information: the higher the opti-
mal degree of coordination, the higher the sensitivity of eﬃcient allocations to public information.
Corollary 1 The relative sensitivity of the eﬃcient allocation to public information is higher than
that of the equilibrium allocation if and only if the optimal degree of coordination is higher than the
equilibrium one, which is turn is true if and only if the complementarity is high enough relative to
second-order non-strategic eﬀects:
γ∗
n ≥ γn ∀n ∈ ¯ N ∩ ¯ N∗ ⇐⇒ α∗ ≥ α ⇐⇒ UkK ≥− UKK. (15)
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 show how the eﬃcient allocation depends on the primitives of the
environment and how it compares to the equilibrium one. As with equilibrium, the optimal degree
of coordination is increasing in the complementarity, UkK,. But unlike equilibrium, the optimal
degree of coordination depends also on UKK, a second-order external eﬀect that does not aﬀect
private incentives. In the absence of such an eﬀect, the optimal degree of coordination is higher (in
absolute value) than the equilibrium one (α∗ =2 α) reﬂecting the internalization of the externality
generated by the complementarity.
To understand better the forces behind the determination of the optimal degree of coordination,
an alternative representation is useful. Welfare (ex-ante utility) at the eﬃcient allocation can be




Va r(K − κ∗)+
|Ukk|
2
Va r(k − K). (16)
Note that EW(κ∗,θ) is ex-ante utility in the ﬁrst-best allocation, while L∗ captures the welfare
losses associated with incomplete information, namely those due to aggregate volatility and cross-
sectional dispersion.19
That volatility and dispersion generate welfare losses follows directly from concavity of prefer-
ences. Naturally, the weight on volatility is given by WKK, the curvature of welfare with respect
to aggregate activity, while the weight on dispersion is given by Ukk, the curvature of utility with
respect to individual activity. Note that WKK = Ukk +2 UkK + UKK. When there are no strategic
and second-order external eﬀects (in the sense that UkK = UKK =0 ) , aggregate welfare inher-
its the curvature of individual utility (WKK = Ukk), so that volatility and dispersion contribute
equally to welfare losses. Complementarity (UkK > 0) helps oﬀset the diminishing returns faced at
the individual level, thus reducing concavity in the aggregate (WKK) and therefore the weight on
volatility. The converse is true for substitutability (UkK < 0) or external concavity (UKK < 0).
19Condition (16) follows from a Taylor expansion around k = K = κ
∗(θ); see the Appendix.
11Volatility is generated by common noise, dispersion by idiosyncratic noise. Increasing the rela-
tive sensitivity of allocations to public information–equivalently, raising the degree of coordination–
dampens dispersion at the expense of higher volatility. The eﬃcient use of information reﬂects the
resolution of this trade-oﬀ.
Corollary 2 The optimal degree of coordination equals one minus the weight that welfare assigns





Extension. In some applications of interest, cross-sectional dispersion has a direct external
eﬀect on individual utility. For example, price dispersion has a negative eﬀect on individual utility
in New-Keynesian monetary models (see Hellwig, 2005). In the beauty contest of Morris and Shin
(2002), on the other hand, dispersion has positive external eﬀect (see Section 6.2).
We can easily accommodate such an eﬀect–and we do so for the rest of the paper–provided
that dispersion enters linearly in the utility function: U(k,K,θ,σ2
k) with Uσ2




(k − K)2dΨ(k). Then all our results go through once we replace the welfare weight on
dispersion with Ukk +2 Uσ2








Va r(k − K). (18)






Finally condition (15) becomes
γ∗
n ≥ γn ∀n ∈ ¯ N ∩ ¯ N∗ ⇐⇒ α∗ ≥ α ⇐⇒ UkK ≥− UKK +2 Uσ2
k.
Note that α∗ is increasing in UKK (or η) and decreasing in Uσ2
k (or ω). This is intuitive.
Ah i g h e rUKK decreases the social cost of volatility, while a higher Uσ2
k decreases the social cost
of dispersion. Both these eﬀects are external and non-strategic–they aﬀect the social value of
coordination without aﬀecting private incentives. The former contributes to a higher optimal
degree of coordination, the latter to a lower.
Eﬃcient economies. We conclude this section with necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the equilibrium to be eﬃcient under incomplete information.
20In analogy to WKK < 0, we impose Ukk +2 Uσ2
k < 0, which is necessary and suﬃcient for welfare to depend
negatively on dispersion.
12Proposition 5 The equilibrium is eﬃcient if and only if
κ(·)=κ∗(·) and α = α∗,
or, equivalently, UkK+UKK−2Uσ2
k =0 ,U K (0,0,0) = Uk (0,0,0)UkK/Ukk, and UKθn = UkθnUkK/Ukk
for all n.
The condition κ(·)=κ∗(·) means that the equilibrium is eﬃcient under complete information.
But eﬃciency under complete information alone does not guarantee eﬃciency under incomplete
information. What is also needed is eﬃciency in the use of information which obtains when in
addition the equilibrium and the optimal degrees of coordination coincide.21
5 Social value of information
We now examine the impact of information on equilibrium welfare (allowing for Uσ2
k 6=0 ), starting
with economies where the equilibrium is eﬃcient. This provides a useful benchmark, not only
because eﬃciency is always an excellent starting point, but also because in our class of economies
eﬃciency implies a clear relation between the form of strategic interaction and the social value of
information.
Proposition 6 Suppose the equilibrium is eﬃcient. For any n ∈ ¯ N, welfare necessarily decreases
with σn, and increases [decreases] with δn if and only if agents’ actions are strategic complements
[substitutes].
As highlighted in the previous section, the impact of information on welfare at the eﬃcient
allocation is summarized in the impact of noise on volatility and dispersion (see condition (18)).
An increase in σn for given δn raises both volatility and dispersion and therefore necessarily reduces
welfare. An increase in δn for given σn, on the other hand, is equivalent to a reduction in dispersion,
possibly at the expenses of volatility. Such a substitution is welfare-improving if and only if the
social cost of dispersion is higher than that of volatility, that is, if and only if α∗ > 0.
Note that, when the equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient, it maximizes ex-ante expected utility.
That accuracy is beneﬁcial can then be obtained also an implication of Blackwell’s theorem. Indeed,
the same observation implies that, when the equilibrium is eﬃcient, welfare necessarily decreases
with either σxn or σyn, for any n ∈ ¯ N.
Corollary 3 Suppose the equilibrium is eﬃcient. Welfare necessarily increases with the precision
of either private or public information.
21Note that α and α
∗ depend on U but not on (σ,δ). This explains why eﬃciency can be checked on the basis of
the payoﬀ structure alone, as shown in Proposition 5 above.
13In economies where the equilibrium is ineﬃcient, the welfare eﬀects of information are more
complicated for two reasons. First, the equilibri u md e g r e eo fc o o r d i n a t i o nn e e dn o tc o i n c i d ew i t h
the optimal one (α 6= α∗), thus introducing ineﬃciency in the way the trade-oﬀ between volatility
and dispersion is resolved. Second, the equilibrium level of activity may diﬀer from the socially
optimal one even under complete information (κ 6= κ∗), thus introducing ﬁrst-order welfare losses
in addition to those associated with volatility and dispersion.
Consider ﬁrst the role of α 6= α∗, maintaining for a moment κ = κ∗. The welfare losses associated
with incomplete information continue to be the weighted sum of volatility and dispersion, as in
(18).22 For given α,ah i g h e rα∗ means a lower relative weight on volatility and hence a lower
cost associated with an increase in δn.23 It follows that, relatively to the eﬃciency benchmark
(Proposition 6), ineﬃciently low coordination (α<α ∗) increases the social value of transparency,
while ineﬃciently high coordination (α>α ∗) reduces it. On the other hand, the possibility that
α 6= α∗ does not aﬀect the value of accuracy: a lower σn reduces both volatility and dispersion and
therefore necessarily increases welfare.
Consider next the role of κ 6= κ∗, in which case the equilibrium is ineﬃcient even under complete
information. In equilibrium, welfare is given by Eu = EW(κ,θ) − L, where
L = −Cov(K − κ,WK(κ,θ)) +
|WKK|
2




· Va r(k − K) (19)
are the welfare losses due to incomplete information.24 The last two terms in L are the familiar
welfare losses associated with volatility and dispersion (second-order eﬀects). The covariance term,
on the other hand, captures a novel ﬁrst-order eﬀect. When the complete-information equilibrium is
eﬃcient (κ = κ∗ and hence WK(κ,θ)=0 ), the covariance term is zero; this is merely an implication
of the fact that small deviations around a maximum have zero ﬁrst-order eﬀects. But when the
complete-information equilibrium is ineﬃcient due to externalities (WK(κ,θ) 6=0 ), the covariance
term contributes to a welfare loss or gain; this is because a positive [negative] correlation between
K − κ, the “error” in aggregate activity due to incomplete information, and WK(κ,θ),t h es o c i a l
return to activity, mitigates [exacerbates] the ﬁrst-order losses associated with externalities.
As shown in the Appendix (Proof of Proposition 7), this covariance term can be expressed as




22As obvious from the derivation of (16) in the Appendix, (16) and similarly (18) extend to α 6= α
∗ as long as
κ = κ
∗. This can also be seen from (19) below noting that WK(κ,θ)=0when κ = κ
∗.
23Recall from Proposition 2 that volatility increases with δn if and only if α<0 or δ<(1 − α)/α, which we assume
here in order to simplify the discussion. In the alternative case, welfare necessarily increases with δn (when κ = κ
∗).
24Condition (19) follows from a Taylor expansion around K = κ(θ); see Appendix.






Cov( κ∗ − κ,κ | θ−n )




1 − α + αδn
κ2
nσ2
n = Cov( K − κ,κ | θ−n ),
with θ−n standing for (θj)j6=n. The coeﬃcients vn capture the covariation between K − κ, the
aggregate “error” due to incomplete information, and κ, the complete-information equilibrium,
while the coeﬃcients φn capture the covariation between the latter and κ∗ − κ, the eﬃciency gap
under complete information.
Al o w e rσn always implies a vn closer to zero, for less noise brings K closer to κ for any given
θ. But how this aﬀects welfare depends on whether getting K closer to κ also means getting K
closer to κ∗, which in turn depends on the correlation between complete-information equilibrium
and ﬁrst best. Intuitively, less noise brings K closer to κ∗ when φn > 0 but further away when
φn < 0. As a result, the welfare contribution of a lower σn through the covariance term in (19) is
positive when φn > 0 but negative when φn < 0. Combining this with the eﬀect of σn on volatility
and dispersion, we conclude that higher accuracy necessarily increases welfare when φn > 0 (i.e.,
when the correlation between equilibrium and ﬁrst best is positive) but can reduce welfare when
φn is suﬃciently negative.
T h ei m p a c to fδn on vn, on the other hand, depends on the sign of the complementarity: higher
transparency increases the covariance between K and κ when α>0 but decreases it when α<0.
How this in turn aﬀects welfare depends again on the sign of φn. Hence, as evident from (20),
the sign of the eﬀect of δn on ﬁrst-order welfare losses depends on the sign of the product of α
and φn. Combining this with the eﬀects of δn on volatility and dispersion, and noting that the
covariance term dominates for φn suﬃciently away from zero, we conclude that φn suﬃciently high
[low] suﬃces for the welfare eﬀect of δ to have the same [opposite] sign as α.
These insights are veriﬁed in the following complete characterization of the welfare eﬀects of
information.
Proposition 7 There exist functions φ,φ 0, ¯ φ, ¯ φ
0 :( −1,1) × (−∞,1) → R, with φ ≤ ¯ φ and φ0 ≤
¯ φ
0 < 0, s u c ht h a tt h ef o l l o w i n ga r et r u ef o ra n yn ∈ ¯ N:
[Strategic Independece] When α =0 , welfare increases [decreases] with δn for all (σn,δn) if
and only if α∗ > 0[ α∗ < 0].
[Strategic Complementarity] When α ∈ (0,1), welfare increases [decreases] with δn for all
(σn,δn) if and only if φn > ¯ φ(α,α∗)[ φn <φ (α,α∗)].
[Strategic Substitutability] When α ∈ (−1,0), welfare increases [decreases] with δn for all
(σn,δn) if and only if φn <φ (α,α∗)[ φn > ¯ φ(α,α∗)].
15[Accuracy] Welfare decreases [increases] with σn for all (σn,δn) if and only if φ>¯ φ
0 (α,α∗)
[φ<φ 0 (α,α∗)]
The functions φ,φ 0, ¯ φ, ¯ φ
0 are invariant with E and satisfy the following properties: (i) φ = φ0 = ¯ φ =
¯ φ
0 = −1
2 whenever α = α∗; (ii) for α ∈ (0,1),φ < 0 if and only if α>1/2 or α∗ > −α2/(1 − 2α),
while ¯ φ<0 if and only if α∗ >α 2; and (iii) for α ∈ (−1,0),φ< 0 if and only if α∗ <α 2, while
¯ φ<0 if and only if α∗ < −α2/(1 − 2α).
By Proposition 5, the equilibrium is eﬃcient if and only if α = α∗ and κ = κ∗, in which case
the welfare eﬀects of information are given by 6. If the only ineﬃciency is either that κ0 6= κ∗
0 or
that κ∗
n 6=0 ( =κn) for some n/ ∈ ¯ N, then this ineﬃciency does not aﬀect the comparative statics of
equilibrium welfare with respect to (δn,σn) for n ∈ ¯ N; that is, Proposition 6 continues to hold for
all n ∈ ¯ N as long as α = α∗ and φn =0for all n ∈ ¯ N. Away from this benchmark, Proposition
5 implies that the social value of information can still be understood as a function of α, α∗, and
(φn)n∈ ¯ N. We conclude that understanding the eﬃcient use of information–which is what we did
in the previous section–is also instrumental for understanding the social value of information.
The following suﬃcient conditions are then immediate for the case where κ∗−κ, the complete-
information eﬃciency gap, is either constant or positively correlated with κ.
Corollary 4 Suppose (φn)n∈ ¯ N ≥ 0, in which case Cov(κ∗ − κ,κ) ≥ 0. Then, welfare always in-
creases with the accuracy of information, whereas it increases with its transparency if α∗ ≥ α>0,
and decreases with it if α∗ ≤ α<0.
The following case is also interesting, as it contrasts with the Blackwell-like result we encoun-
tered earlier for eﬃcient economies.
Corollary 5 Suppose φn < −1/2 and α = α∗ =0 . Welfare decreases with the precision of either
private or public information about θn.
6 Applications
In this section, we show how our results may help understand the relation between equilibrium
and eﬃcient allocations and the welfare eﬀects of information in speciﬁc contexts of interest. For
simplicity, in most cases we assume a single fundamental variable (N =1 )and drop the index n.
6.1 Investment complementarities
The canonical model of production externalities can be nested by interpreting k as investment and
deﬁning individual payoﬀsa sf o l l o w s :
U(k,K,θ)=A(K,θ)k − c(k), (21)
16where A(K,θ)=( 1− a)θ + aK represents the private return to investment, with a ∈ (0,1/2) and
θ ∈ R,a n dc(k)=k2/2 the private cost of investment.25 Variants of this speciﬁcation appear in
Bryant (1983), Romer (1986), Matsuyama (1992), Acemoglu (1993), and Benhabib and Farmer
(1994), as well as models of network externalities and spillovers in technology adoption. The
important ingredient is that the private return to investment increases with the aggregate level of
investment–the source of both complementarity and externality in this class of models.
The equilibrium level of investment under complete information is κ = θ, whereas the ﬁrst best
is κ∗ = 1−a
1−2aθ, and hence φ = a
1−2a > 0. That is, investment is ineﬃciently low for all θ>0, and
t h em o r es ot h eh i g h e rθ. Furthermore, Ukk = −1,U kK = a>0, and UKK = Uσ2
k =0 . That is,
there is a positive complementarity but no other second-order external eﬀect. It follows that the
equilibrium degree of coordination is positive and the optimal one is also positive and indeed higher
that the equilibrium one: α = a>0 and α∗ =2 α>α>0. Using this together with Corollary 4,
we have the following result.
Corollary 6 In the investment example described above, coordination is ineﬃciently low and wel-
fare unambiguously increases with both the accuracy and the transparency of information.
In this example the agents’ private desire to coordinate is, not only socially warranted, but
actually not strong enough. It is then intuitive that higher transparency, or more precise public
information, necessarily increases welfare by facilitating better coordination.26
Economies with frictions in ﬁnancial markets–where complementarities emerge through col-
lateral constraints, missing assets, or other types of market incompleteness–are often related to
economies with investment complementarities like the one considered here. Although this is appro-
priate for many positive questions, it need not be so for normative purposes. As the examples we
study in the next two sections highlight, the result here depends on the absence of certain second-
order external eﬀects and on a suﬃciently strong correlation between equilibrium and ﬁrst-best
activity. Whether these properties are shared by mainstream incomplete-market models is an open
question.
6.2 “Beauty contests” vs. other Keynesian frictions
Keynes contended that ﬁnancial markets often behave like “beauty contests” in the sense that
traders try to forecast and outbid one another’s forecasts, but this motive is (presumably) not
25This is the example we examined in Angeletos and Pavan (2004), although there we computed welfare conditional
on θ, thus omitting the eﬀect of Cov(κ,K − κ) on welfare losses.
26Translating these results in terms of σx and σy, it is easy to show that welfare unambiguously increases with a
r e d u c t i o ni ne i t h e rσx or σy. Hence, both public and private information are beneﬁcial in this example. However, a
higher α, by increasing the value of transparency, increases the welfare gain of public information and decreases that
of private information.
17warranted from a social perspective because it is due to some (unspeciﬁe d )m a r k e ti m p e r f e c t i o n .
Capturing this idea with proper microfoundations is an open question, but one possible shortcut,
following Morris and Shin (2002), is to deﬁne a “beauty-contest economy” as an economy in which
α>0=α∗ and κ(·)=κ∗(·). The ﬁrst condition means that the private motive to coordinate is not
warranted from a social perspective; the second means that the ineﬃciency of equilibrium vanishes
as information becomes complete. By Proposition 7 we then have the following.
Corollary 7 In beauty-contest economies, welfare is increasing in accuracy but non-monotonic in
transparency.
The speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ structure assumed by Morris and Shin (2002) is given by
ui = −(1 − r) · (ki − θ)2 − r · (Li − ¯ L)
where θ ∈ R is the underlying fundamental, Li = L(ki) ≡
R
(k0 − ki)
2 dΨ(k0) is the mean square-
distance of agent i0s action from other agents’ actions, ¯ L =
R
L(k)dΨ(k) is the cross-sectional mean
of Li, and r ∈ (0,1).27 This example is nested in our framework with28
U(k,K,θ,σ2
k)=−(1 − r) · (k − θ)2 − r · (k − K)2 + r · σ2
k.
It follows that κ∗ = κ = θ, Ukk = −2,U kK =2 r, UKK = −2r, Uσ2
k = r, and hence α = r>0=α∗.
Note how this example features two external eﬀects that tilt the trade-oﬀ between volatility and
dispersion in the opposite direction than the complementarity. In particular, UKK < 0 increases
the social cost of volatility, while Uσ2
k > 0 decreases the social cost of dispersion. Both eﬀects
are non-strategic, in the sense that they do not aﬀect private incentives, and both contribute to
reducing the social value of coordination. In the speciﬁc example considered by Morris and Shin
(2002), these eﬀects perfectly oﬀset the impact of the complementarity, so that the optimal level
of coordination is zero–which explains why transparency, and thereby public information, can be
welfare-reducing.
Keyensian frictions such as monopolistic competition or incomplete markets are in the heart of
various macroeconomic complementarities (a.k.a. “multipliers” or “accelerators”). These frictions
share with beauty contests the idea that complementarity originates in some market imperfection.
However, the normative properties of beauty contests need not be shared by other Keynesian
frictions.
27The ﬁrst term in ui captures the value of taking an action close to a fundamental “target” θ.T h e Li term
introduces a private value for taking an action close to others’ actions, whereas the ¯ L term ensures that there is
no social value in doing so. Indeed, aggregating across agents gives w = −(1 − r)
R
(k − θ)
2dΨ(k),s ot h a t ,f r o ma
social perspective, it is as if utility were simply u = −(k − θ)
2, in which case there is of course no social value to
coordination.
28Note that Li =
R
((k
0 − K) − (ki − K))
2 dΨ(k
0)=( ki − K)
2 + σ
2
k, ¯ L =2· σ
2




18Consider, for example, new-Keynesian monetary models where complementarity emerges in
pricing decisions (e.g., Woodford, 2003; Hellwig, 2005; Lorenzoni, 2005; Roca, 2005). In this
class of models, imperfect substitutability across goods results in a negative externality from cross-
sectional dispersion in prices (Uσ2
k < 0), which in turn contributes to a higher optimal degree of
coordination–the opposite of what happens in the beauty contest above. Hellwig (2005) provides
an excellent analysis of this class of models. He shows that the optimal sensitivity to public
information is higher than the equilibrium one. Moreover, the business cycle is eﬃcient under
complete information. Translating these properties in our framework gives α∗ >α>0 and φ =0 ,
in which case, by Corollary 4, welfare increases with both accuracy and transparency. This helps
understand why, unlike in Morris and Shin (2002), public information is welfare improving in
Hellwig (2005) and Roca (2005).
6.3 Ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations
The focus in the previous section was on how the complementarity and second-order eﬀects tilt the
trade-oﬀ between volatility and dispersion. We now turn focus to ﬁrst-order eﬀects. In particular,
we consider economies where the eﬃciency gap κ∗−κ co-varies negatively with κ–that is, economies
where recessions are ineﬃciently deep.
To isolate the impact of ﬁrst-order eﬀects (φ 6=0 ) , we abstract from strategic and second-order
external eﬀects (UkK = UKK = Uσ2
k =0 ) , so that α∗ = α =0 . From Proposition 7 then φ<−1/2 is
necessary and suﬃcient for welfare to decrease with accuracy and be independent of transparency.
Corollary 8 Suppose that α∗ = α =0and that equilibrium ﬂuctuations are suﬃciently ineﬃcient
in the sense that Cov(κ,κ∗) < 1
2Va r(κ). Then welfare decreases with either private or public
information.
As an example, consider an economy where θ =( θ1,θ2) ∈ R2 and where agents engage in an
investment activity without complementarity but for which private and social returns diﬀer:
U(k,K,θ,σ2
k)=θ1k − k2/2+λ(θ2 − θ1)K,
for some λ/ ∈ (0,1). The private return to investment is θ1, while the social return is θ2 6= θ1. It
follows that κ = θ1, while κ∗ =( 1− λ)θ1 + λθ2, and hence φ1 = −λ. If λ<1/2, meaning that
the discrepancy between private and social returns is small enough, then φ1 > −1/2 and welfare
increases with either private or public information about θ1.B u t i f λ<1/2, meaning that the
correlation between private and social returns is close to zero, then φ = −1 < −1/2 and welfare
decreases with either private or public information about θ1.As p e c i a lc a s eo ft h i si sw h e nλ =1
and σθ2 =0 , so that κ∗ is constant and the entire ﬂuctuation in investment is ineﬃcient.29
29If we maintain that the correlation between κ and κ
∗ is low enough but let α
∗ = α>0, then welfare continues to
19The recent debate on the merits of transparency in central bank communication has focused
on the role of complementarities in new-Keynesian models (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2002; Svensson,
2005; Woodford, 2005; Hellwig, 2005; Roca, 2005). The results of this and the previous section
suggest that this debate might be somewhat misfocused–a critical role is played by the ineﬃciency
of equilibrium ﬂuctuations.
For example, we conjecture that the result in Hellwig (2005) and Roca (2005) that public
information has a positive eﬀect on welfare relies on the property that the business cycle is eﬃcient
in these models. In standard new-Keynesian models (e.g., Woodford, 2003) the monopolistic mark-
up introduces an eﬃciency gap. As long ﬂuctuations are driven by productivity, taste, or monetary
shocks–which is the case in Hellwig (2005) and Roca (2005)–this gap remains constant over the
business cycle. But if the business cycle is driven by shocks in mark-ups or the “labor wedge,” it
seems possible that providing markets with information that helps predict these shocks can reduce
welfare. This is an interesting question that we leave open for future research.
6.4 Eﬃcient competitive economies
The examples considered so far feature either positive complementarity or some form of ineﬃciency.
We now turn to competitive economies where agents’ choices are strategic substitutes and where
the equilibrium is eﬃcient under both complete and incomplete information.30
There is a continuum of households, each consisting of a consumer and a producer, and two
commodities. Let q1i and q2i denote the respective quantities purchased by consumer i (the con-
sumer living in household i). His preferences are given by
ui = v(q1i,θ)+q2i, (22)
where v(q,θ)=θq − bq2/2,θ∈ R, and b>0, while his budget is
pq1i + q2i = e + πi, (23)
where p is the price of good 1 relative to good 2, e is an exogenous endowment of good 2, and πi
are the proﬁts of producer i (the producer living in household i), which are also denominated in
terms of good 2. Proﬁts in turn are given by
πi = pki − c(ki) (24)
decrease with accuracy but now it also decreases with transparency–which strengthens particularly the case against
public information.
30We constructed this class of quadratic competitive economies independently but then found out that Vives (1988)
had proved eﬃciency of equilibria for exactly this class long before us. Hence, with regard to this particular class,
only the welfare eﬀects of information are novel here.
20where ki denotes the quantity of good 1 produced by household i and c(k) the cost in terms of
good 2, with c(k)=k2/2.31
The random variable θ represents a shock in the relative demand for the two goods. Exchange
and consumption take place once θ has become common knowledge. On the contrary, production
takes place at an earlier stage, when information is still incomplete.
Consumer i chooses (q1i,q 2i) so as to maximize (22) subject to (23), which gives p = θ − bq1i.
Clearly, all households consume the same quantity of good 1, which together with market clearing
gives q1i = K for all i and p = θ − bK, where K =
R
kdΨ(k). It follows that i’s utility can be
restated as ui = v(K,θ)−pK+e+πi = bK2/2+e+πi,w h e r eπi = pki−c(ki)=( θ−bK)ki−k2
i /2.
This example is thus nested in our model with
U(k,K,θ,σ2
k)=( θ − bK)ki − k2
i/2+bK2/2+e,
in which case κ∗ = κ = θ/(1 + b),U kk = −1,U kK = −b, UKK = b, Uσ2
k =0 , and therefore φ =0
and α∗ = α = −b<0.
That the complete-information equilibrium is eﬃcient (κ = κ∗) should not be a surprise. Un-
der complete information, the economy is merely an example of a complete-markets competitive
economy in which the ﬁrst welfare theorem applies. What is interesting is that the equilibrium
remains (constrained) eﬃcient under incomplete information, despite the absence of ex-ante com-
plete markets. This is because the strategic substitutability perceived by the agents coincides with
the one that the planner would have liked them to perceive (α∗ = α).32 The following is then a
direct implication of Proposition 6.
Corollary 9 In the competitive economy described above, the equilibrium is eﬃcient and welfare
unambiguously decreases with both δ and σ.
This result may be relevant for the debate on transparency vs. constructive ambiguity in
monetary policy. If we interpret “transparent” central bank disclosures as information that admits
a single common interpretation and “ambiguous” disclosures as information that admits multiple
idiosyncratic interpretations, then the result above makes a case for constructive ambiguity. This
may be reminiscent of Morris and Shin (2002), but is diﬀerent. Whereas the result there was
driven by ineﬃciently high coordination (α∗ =0<α ), here it is due to eﬃcient substitutability
(α∗ = α<0). It is perhaps more surprising that a case for constructive ambiguity can be made
even for eﬃcient competitive economies.













i for good 1 and 2, respectively.
32The equilibrium would be ineﬃcient if we had deﬁned welfare as producer surplus alone, which may be relevant
for open economies that are net exporters of good 2. In this case, ui = πi and therefore α
∗ = −2b<α= −b<0; that
is, the cooperative solution between the producers would involve stronger substitutability (and hence less sensitivity
to public information) than equilibrium.
21Finally, this last result opens up the possibility that the informative role of prices may be
welfare damaging even in competitive economies where the use of information is eﬃcient. For
example, suppose that an exogenous increase in the informativeness of prices–caused for example
by a reduction in the impact of noisy traders in ﬁnancial markets–leads agents to reduce their
costly collection of private information. Due to strategic substitutability, such a substitution of
private information for public information could reduce welfare even if agents’ overall uncertainty
reduces.33
Clearly, the model in this paper does not allow for information aggregation through prices, but
extending the results in this direction seems a promising line for future research.
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κn [(1 − γn)θn + γnzn].
Hence k − K =
P
n∈ ¯ N κn [(1 − γn)(xn − θn)] and K − κ =
P
n∈ ¯ N κnγn(zn − θn). Using
Va r(xn − θn)=σ2
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(6), we have
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which gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i). Since U is quadratic, (8) can be rewritten as
E[ Uk(κ∗,κ ∗,θ)+Ukk · (k(x,y) − κ∗)+UkK · (K − κ∗)+
+ UK(κ∗,κ ∗,θ)+( UkK + UKK) · (K − κ∗) | x,y ]=0 .
33Of course, for this to be true it must be that there is some ineﬃciency in the collection of information, or
otherwise Blackwell’s theorem would again imply that any exogenous information is beneﬁcial.
22Using WK(κ∗,θ)=Uk(κ∗,κ ∗,θ)+UK(κ∗,κ ∗,θ)=0 , the above reduces to
E[ Ukk (k(x,y) − κ∗)+( 2 UkK + UKK)(K − κ∗) | x,y ]=0 ,
which together with WKK = Ukk +2 UkK + UKK gives (12).
Part (ii) follows from the same steps as in the proof of Proposition (1) replacing α with α∗ and
κ(·) with κ∗(·).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Consider ﬁrst part (ii). When agents perceive payoﬀst ob eU0,
the equilibrium is the unique function k : R2N → R that solves
k(x,y)=E[( 1− α0)κ0 + α0K | x,y ], (25)






NθN is the unique solution to U0
k(κ0,κ 0,θ)=0 . From the same arguments as in the proof of














n = δn +
α0δn(1 − δn)
1 − α0(1 − δn)
∀n ∈ ¯ N0 ≡ {n ≥ 1:κ0
n 6=0 } 6= ∅
For this to coincide with the eﬃcient allocation for all (x,y) ∈ R2N, it is necessary and suﬃcient
that κ0(·)=κ∗(·) and that α0 = α∗, which proves part (ii).
For part (i) it suﬃces to let U0(k,K,θ)=U(k,K,θ)+UK(K,K,θ)k, in which case it is imme-
diate that κ0(·)=κ∗(·), and α0 = α∗.
P r o o fo fC o n d i t i o n( 1 6 ) . Since U is quadratic, a second-order Taylor expansion around
k = K is exact:
U(k,K,θ)=U(K,K,θ)+Uk(K,K,θ) · (k − K)+
Ukk
2
· (k − K)2.
It follows that ex-ante utility is given by




where k = k(x,y) and K = K(θ,ε) are shortcuts for the eﬃcient allocation and W(K,θ) ≡
U(K,K,θ). A quadratic expansion of W(K,θ) around κ∗, which is exact since U and thus W are
quadratic, gives
W(K,θ)=W(κ∗,θ)+WK(κ∗,θ) · (K − κ∗)+
WKK
2
· (K − κ∗)2.




· E[(K − κ∗)2]+
Ukk
2
· E[(k − K)2].
At the eﬃcient allocation, k − κ∗ =
P
n∈ ¯ N∗ κ∗
n [(1 − γ∗
n)(xn − θn)+γ∗
n(zn − θn)] implying that
Ek = EK = Eκ∗ and therefore E[(K −κ∗)2]=Va r(K −κ∗) and E[(k −K)2]=Va r(k−K), which
gives the result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . The result follows directly from the proof of Proposition 4 together
with the deﬁnitions of κ(·),κ ∗(·),αand α∗.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Suppose κ(·)=κ∗(·) and α = α∗ and consider the set K of
allocations that satisfy
k(x,y)=E[(1 − α0)κ + α0K|x,y]
for some α0 < 1, or equivalently k(x,y)=κ0 +
P




n = δn +
α0δn(1 − δn)
1 − α0(1 − δn)
for all n ∈ ¯ N.
Clearly, the equilibrium (and eﬃcient) allocation is nested with α0 = α(= α∗). Since for any any














Ω ≡ (1 − α∗)Va r(K − κ)+Va r(k − K).
Using
Va r(K − κ)=
X















Va r(k − K)=
X





































Note that Eu depends on α0 and (δn,σn),f o rn ∈ ¯ N, only through Ω.S i n c e t h e e ﬃcient














24Next note that Ω increases, and hence Eu decreases, with any σn. Finally, consider the eﬀect of

























Using (26), we thus have that dEu/dδn > [<]0 if and only if γ∗
n/(1 − γ∗
n) > [<] δn/(1 − δn), which
is the case if and only if α∗ > [<]0. Using α = α∗ (by eﬃciency) then gives the result.












= U(K,K,θ,0) + Uk(K,K,θ,0)(k − K)+
Ukk
2
(k − K)2 + Uσ2
kσ2
k.
Using the fact that σ2
k = E[(k−K)2|θ,ε] and hence Eσ2






· E[(k − K)2].






Eu = EW(κ,θ)+E[WK(κ,θ) · (K − κ)] +
WKK
2




· E[(k − K)2].
In equilibrium, Ek = EK = Eκ and therefore, E[WK(κ,θ) · (K − κ)] = Cov[WK(κ,θ),(K − κ)],
E[(K − κ)]2 = Va r(K − κ) and E[(k − K)2]=Va r(k − K), which gives the result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . We prove the result in three steps. Step 1 computes the welfare
losses due to incomplete information. Step 2 derives the comparative statics. Step 3 characterizes
the bounds φ, ¯ φ, φ0, ¯ φ
0.
Step 1. The property that W is quadratic, along with WK(κ∗,θ)=0(by deﬁnition of the ﬁrst
best), and WKK < 0,i m p l yt h a t
WK(κ,θ)=WK(κ∗,θ)+WKK · (κ − κ∗)=|WKK|·(κ∗ − κ).
It follows that
Cov(K − κ,WK(κ,θ)) = |WKK|·Cov(K − κ,κ∗ − κ). (27)
Since K − κ =
P
κnγn(zn − θn),z n − θn =
£
λn(εn)+( 1− λn)(μθn − θn)
¤
, and (εn,ε j,θn,θj) are
mutually orthogonal whenever n 6= j, we have
Cov(K − κ,κ∗ − κ)=Cov(
P
κnγn(zn − θn) ,
P
(κ∗














nγn [−(1 − λn)Va r(θn)]
25Using φn ≡ (κ∗






n/δn, we have that














Cov( K − κ,κ | θ−n )=κ2
nγnCov(zn − θn,θn)=−
1




N e x t ,a si nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,




(1 − α + αδn)2κ2
nσ2
n (29)
Va r(k − K)=
X
n∈ ¯ N
(1 − α)2(1 − δn)
(1 − α + αδn)2 κ2
nσ2
n. (30)
Substituting (27)-(30) into (19), using v =( 1− α∗)|Ukk +2 Uσ2












(1 − α∗)[2φ(1 − α + αδ)+δ]+( 1− α)2(1 − δ)
(1 − α + αδ)2 . (31)
Step 2. Note that EW(κ,θ) is independent of (δn,σn) and hence the comparative statics of


























α2[(1 − δn)(1 − α) − δn] − α∗(1 − α − αδn) − 2αφ(1 − α∗)(1 − α + αδn)
(1 − α + αδn)3




and hence, for any n ∈ ¯ N, ∂L/∂δn > [<]0 i fa n do n l yi fα∗ < [>]0.





[1 − α + αδn]2α[f(α,α∗,δn) − φn],
26where
f(α,α∗,δ) ≡
α2[(1 − δ)(1 − α) − δ] − α∗(1 − α − αδ)
2α(1 − α + αδ)(1 − α∗)
.
Since α∗ < 1, sign[∂L/∂δn]=sign[α] · sign[f(α,α∗,δn) − φn].L e t
φ(α,α∗) ≡ min
δ∈[0,1]
f(α,α∗,δ) and ¯ φ(α,α∗) ≡ max
δ∈[0,1]
f(α,α∗,δ).
If φn ∈ (φ, ¯ φ), then ∂L/∂δn alternates sign as δn varies between 0 and 1, no matter whether α>0
or α<0. Hence, φn <φis necessary and suﬃcient for ∂L/∂δn > 0 ∀δn when α>0 and for
∂L/∂δn < 0 ∀δn when α<0, whereas φn > ¯ φ is necessary and suﬃcient for ∂L/∂δn < 0 ∀δn when
α>0 and for ∂L/∂δn > 0 ∀δn when α<0.
Finally, note that ∂L/∂σ2
n > [<]0i fa n do n l yi fφn > [<] g(α,α∗,δn), where
g(α,α∗,δ)=−
(1 − α)2(1 − δ)+δ(1 − α∗)









we get that ∂L/∂σ2
n > 0[ < 0] for all δn ∈ [0,1] if φn > ¯ φ
0 [<φ 0], whereas ∂L/∂σ2
n alternates sign
as δn varies if φn ∈ (φ0, ¯ φ
0).








(1 − α∗)(1 − α + αδ)2(α∗ − α)






When instead α∗ >α ,fis strictly increasing (and g strictly decreasing) in δ, so that
φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,0) < ¯ φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,1),
φ0(α,α∗)=g(α,α∗,1) < ¯ φ
0(α,α∗)=g(α,α∗,0),
and when α∗ <α ,fis strictly decreasing in δ and
φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,1) < ¯ φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,0)
φ0(α,α∗)=g(α,α∗,0) < ¯ φ
0(α,α∗)=g(α,α∗,1).
Consider ﬁrst the case α ∈ (0,1). If α∗ >α ,then α2 +( 1− 2α)α∗ > 0 (using the fact that
α∗ < 1) and therefore
φ(α,α∗) < ¯ φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,1) = −
α2 +( 1− 2α)α∗
2α(1 − α∗)
< 0.
27If instead α∗ <α ,then
φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,1) = −
α2 +( 1− 2α)α∗
2α(1 − α∗)
< ¯ φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,0) = −
α∗ − α2
2α(1 − α∗)
and therefore φ < 0 i fa n do n l yi fα>1/2 or α∗ > −α2/(1−2α), while ¯ φ<0 if and only if α∗ >α 2.
Since −α2/(1 − 2α) < 0 whenever α<1/2, we conclude that, for α ∈ (0,1),φ< 0 i fa n do n l yi f
α>1/2 or α∗ > −α2/(1 − 2α), and ¯ φ<0 i fa n do n l yi fα∗ >α 2.




< ¯ φ(α,α∗)=f(α,α∗,1) =
α2 +( 1− 2α)α∗
(−2α)(1 − α∗)
and hence φ < 0 i fa n do n l yi fα∗ <α 2, while ¯ φ<0 i fa n do n l yi fα∗ < −α2/(1 − 2α). If instead
α∗ <α ,then α∗ < 0 <α 2 and hence














Together with the monotonicity of g, this implies that φ0 ≤ ¯ φ
0 < 0 for all (α,α∗), ¯ φ
0 < −1/2
whenever α<α ∗, and φ0 > −1/2 whenever α>α ∗.
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